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ARTICLE
The Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga: military reform and 
nation-building in a divided polity
Sardar Aziza and Andrew Cotteyb
aKurdistan Regional Parliament, Kurdistan, Iraq; bDepartment of Government and Politics, University College 
Cork, Cork, Ireland
ABSTRACT
During the war against Islamic State from 2014 to 2017 the Iraqi 
Kurdish Peshmerga became important local allies of the United 
States and its international partners, playing a significant role in the 
eventual defeat of Islamic State. In 2017, backed by the US and its 
Western allies, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) agreed plans 
to reform and modernize the Peshmerga. This article provides an 
analysis of this reform process. Reform is severely constrained by two 
problems. First, the continuing soft civil war between Iraqi Kurdistan’s 
two main political parties, the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and the 
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), within which both parties view their 
maintenance of independent Peshmerga forces as central to their 
power and political survival. Second, the heroic-mythic status of the 
Peshmerga within Iraqi Kurdish society, which makes it difficult to 
convert the Peshmerga into a “normal” military force. Reform efforts 
to date have not addressed these issues. Until such time as the deep 
political divide between the KDP and the PUK is addressed, Peshmerga 
reform is unlikely to make significant progress – the military cart 
cannot be put before the political horse.
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During the war against Islamic State in northern Syria and northern Iraq from 2014 to 
2017 the Peshmerga – the armed forces of the Iraqi Kurds – became important local allies 
of the United States and its European partners (Atran and Stone 2015; Hannah 2016). 
Against this background, in 2017 the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG), supported 
by the US and its European partners (in particular the United Kingdom, which has been 
a lead player on the issue), put in place a plan to reform and modernize the Peshmerga 
(Abdullah 2017; Davies 2019). This plan, known as “Peshmerga of the Future”, is 
theoretically comprehensive, encompassing 35 detailed points relating to the organiza-
tion, structure and operational capabilities of the Peshmerga. This article provides an 
analysis of this reform process, assessing progress to date and its future prospects. We 
situate our analysis in recent literature on external efforts to support the reform of 
countries’ armed forces or what in official US terminology is referred to as security 
assistance. This literature argues that external efforts to support military reform have 
tended to be technical in nature (focusing on training, the provision of equipment and 
combat effectiveness) and have ignored or downplayed the larger political challenges 
CONTACT Andrew Cottey a.cottey@ucc.ie
DEFENCE STUDIES                                          
2021, VOL. 21, NO. 2, 226–241 
https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2021.1888644
© 2021 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. 
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/ 
licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly 
cited.
involved in military reform, in particular the problems of nation-building (Karlin 2017, 
2018; Shurkin et al. 2018). As a consequence, externally backed military reform efforts 
often fail because they do not address underlying political questions about the control 
and function of armed forces. In particular, in deeply divided societies, military reform 
cannot be addressed without addressing large questions of nation- and state-building. As 
Karlin (2017, 119) puts it, “like all state-building endeavours, these are political, not 
technical exercises.”
We argue that the current efforts to reform the Peshmerga face two obstacles, both of 
which are deeply embedded in Iraqi Kurdish society: first, the long-standing conflict 
between the region’s two main political parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) 
and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), which lies at the heart of Iraqi Kurdish 
politics, and, second, what we describe as the heroic-mythic status of the Peshmerga in 
Iraqi Kurdish society. Although open violence between the KDP and the PUK has only 
occurred at certain points, the civil war between the two parties has been a defining part 
of the political and social fabric of Iraqi Kurdistan for more than half a century. The two 
parties fought a brief civil war in 1996–97, but the relationship between them has been 
one of permanent mistrust and competition.
In its current stage, which we describe as a soft civil war, the KDP-PUK conflict is 
conducted through political discourse, the media, disputes over control of resources and 
governing institutions and sporadic high tensions. This soft civil war maintains polariza-
tion in Iraqi Kurdish politics and society, provides a key source of legitimacy for old 
guard political leaders in the KDP and the PUK and results in a self-reinforcing status 
quo. The Peshmerga, further, are intimately linked to this civil war: each party controls its 
own Peshmerga forces and these forces are a source of political and economic power and, 
ultimately, a guarantee against being subject to the use of force by the other party. Iraqi 
Kurdistan is thus a deeply divided polity (Guelke 2012; Horowitz 1993) and Peshmerga 
reform goes to the heart of this divide. In these circumstances, despite public statements 
of support for the establishment of a single united Peshmerga force, in practice both KDP 
and PUK leaders remain deeply reluctant to surrender control of their Peshmerga forces 
or take the steps that would result in a truly unitary force.
Second, because of their decades long role in defending the region against the Iraqi 
state and pursuing the goal of independence, the Peshmerga have a special and very 
distinctive status in Iraqi Kurdish society: Peshmerga are not simply ordinary citizens but 
heroic defenders of the nation, as such they are viewed as above criticism and not subject 
to the types of normal rules, laws and institutional arrangements that govern militaries in 
most societies. Demands for Peshmerga reform, in particular reforms that would subject 
Peshmerga to legal and institutional constraints or limit their social and economic 
privileges, thus challenge the status of the Peshmerga. Attempting to turn the 
Peshmerga into a modern military under the control of centralised institutions and 
subject to larger democratic norms runs against the grain of what the Peshmerga is 
and how it operates.
The first part of this article provides a primer on the Peshmerga, summarising its 
evolution and key features. The second section examines the KDP-PUK civil war, 
showing how the Peshmerga are deeply intertwined with this conflict and why this 
explains the continuing deep reluctance of KDP and PUK leaders to unify their respective 
Peshmerga forces into a single united force. The third section examines the heroic- 
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mythic status of the Peshmerga in Iraqi Kurdish society, showing how this constitutes 
a further obstacle to reform of the force. The fourth section of the article analyses the 
Peshmerga reform process which was agreed in 2017, showing that progress to date has 
been limited and that the process has so far focussed on technical issues rather than the 
larger political questions. We conclude that, despite rhetorical commitments from KDP 
and PUK leaders to Peshmerga reform, the political support necessary for Peshmerga 
reform to proceed does not really exist and that the external supporters of reform – the 
US and its European allies – lack the leverage to force the hands of Iraqi Kurdish leaders. 
Until such time as the deep political divide between the KDP and the PUK is addressed 
Peshmerga reform is unlikely to make significant progress. The military cart cannot be 
put before the political horse.
The Peshmerga: a primer
The Peshmerga are the armed forces of the Iraqi Kurds. Peshmerga may refer to the 
collection of militias and units that make up the Iraqi Kurdistan forces either as a singular 
noun (the Peshmerga) or an adjective (Peshmerga forces). The term can also refer to 
individual fighters (a Peshmerga or the Peshmergas). The Peshmerga can be dated back 
the Mahabad Republic of 1945–46, a short-lived attempt by Iranian and Iraqi Kurds to 
establish an independent state centred on the northern Iranian town of Mahabad, which 
saw the establishment of its own military force called Peshmerga. The Peshmerga 
emerged in a more substantive way in Iraqi Kurdistan in the 1960s and fought an on- 
off guerilla war for autonomy within or independence from the Iraqi state over the next 
few decades. Following the US-led military intervention in 1991 to protect the Iraqi 
Kurds from attacks by the Saddam Hussein regime, Iraqi Kurdistan gained de facto 
independence, with the establishment of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), 
albeit within the formal context of the Iraqi state. Central Iraqi military and police forces 
were withdrawn from the region and the Peshmerga became the region’s military and 
security forces.
The Peshmerga are a phenomenon distinctive to Iraqi Kurdistan, with particular 
socio-political roots in the region. The Peshmerga are thus different from and have few 
substantive linkages with Turkey’s more well-known Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK, 
from Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê) and its armed wing, the People’s Defence Forces 
(HPG, from Hêzên Parastina Gel), or with the more recently established Syrian Kurdish 
People’s Protection Units (YPG, from Yekîneyên Parastina Gel), which is widely viewed 
as an offshoot of the PKK/HPG. The Iranian Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK, from 
Partiya Jiyana Azad a Kurdistanê) has fought a low-level war against the Iranian 
government since the early 2000s and its fighters are also known as Peshmerga, but 
PJAK is much smaller and less significant than the Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga. In the 
context of the Syrian civil war and the war against Islamic State, Kurds (along with 
a number of other ethnic groups) have also established their own semi-autonomous 
Rojava region, with its own Rojava Peshmerga (with links to KDP) (Federici 2015; Lowe 
2016). This article focuses on the Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga, which are much larger than 
the Rojava and PJAK Peshmerga.
In conceptual terms, the Peshmerga exist in a grey area between being a regular state- 
controlled military (under the control, hypothetically, of the KRG), a guerilla force 
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fighting a war for independence and militia forces under the control of particular political 
parties and/or local commanders. Fliervoet (2018, 7) describes the Peshmerga “soldiers, 
rebels and militiamen”. The Peshmerga fit with the concept of “hybrid actors” which are 
becoming increasingly common in the Middle East in the context of state fragmentation. 
“Hybrid actors” are “a type of armed group that sometimes operates in concert with the 
state and sometimes competes with it” and “depend on state sponsorship and benefit 
from the tools and prerogatives of state power but at the same time enjoy the flexibility 
that comes with not being the state”. Hybrid actors engage in ‘war, diplomacy, politics, 
and propaganda. They build and maintain constituencies, providing not just security but 
also services and ideological guidance (Cambanis et al. 2019, ix–x).
Estimates of the number of Peshmerga range from 190,000 to 250,000 personnel, 
although some sources suggest both higher and lower numbers (Derzsi-Horváth et al. 
2017; Rudaw 2017). This issue is complicated by the fact that retired fighters are often 
also referred to as Peshmerga, as well as by the phenomenon of “ghost” Peshmerga who 
are payed a salary but do not actually work (with those involved splitting the salaries of 
such Peshmerga). Whatever the exact numbers of Peshmerga, for a region with 
a population of five million or so people the Peshmerga are a quite large armed force 
and their numerical strength indicates their importance within Iraqi Kurdish society.
The majority of Peshmerga are under the direct control of Iraqi Kurdistan’s two main 
political parties, the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of 
Kurdistan (PUK), who have fought a cold, and sometimes hot, war since the 1970s. 
The KDP’s Peshmerga are known as 80s units and the PUK’s Peshmerga as 70s units. The 
KDP and the PUK also have other specialised Peshmerga units/forces responsible for 
specific tasks, in particular Asayish (security) forces which are responsible for major 
crimes, particularly those that are security-related or politically sensitive, and intelligence 
forces, the Parastin (“Protection”) of the KDP and the Dazgay Zanyari (“Information 
Apparatus”) of the PUK (Chapman 2009, 3). Since the 2000s there have been efforts to 
unify the Peshmerga into a single force. A Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs was established 
in 2007 (Kurdistan Parliament 2007). In 2009–10 a new Peshmerga force, the Regional 
Guards Brigades (RGB), was created, composed of 14 brigades merged from KDP and 
PUK Peshmerga and theoretically under the control of the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs. 
The KDP have approximately 50,000 Peshmerga, the PUK 48,000 and the RGB 42,000, 
(Derzsi-Horváth et al. 2017; Fliervoet 2018, 16; Rudaw 2017). The RGB are theoretically 
politically neutral, but commanders and units often retain their core loyalties to the KDP 
or the PUK. Command structures for the Peshmerga run through the KDP and the PUK 
and the top political leaders of the two parties are the senior Peshmerga commanders. In 
daily life and the media, Peshmerga are referred to as Peshmerga i parti (KDP) or 
Peshmerga i yaketi (PUK) – i.e., KDP peshmerga or PUK Peshmerga. The Ministry of 
Peshmerga Affairs exists on top of these long-standing informal but powerful institu-
tional arrangements and is relatively weak compared to them. By way of comparison, it is 
as if in the United States the armed forces were composed of units loyal to and with 
command structures running through the Republican and Democratic parties respec-
tively and the Department of Defense and the centralized military command structure 
were only weak institutions on top of these. Fumerton and Van Wilgenburg (2015, 1) 
argue that “(T)he Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs was reconstituted as a joint body in 
2010, but although it presents a veneer of unity, the KDP and the PUK still maintain their 
DEFENCE STUDIES 229
separate Peshmerga forces.” The same pattern exists with the intelligence elements of the 
Peshmerga. Officially, the KDP’s Parastin and the PUK’s Zanyari were combined under 
the umbrella of the Kurdistan Security Council in 2011. According to the head of PUK’s 
intelligence, Lahur Talabani, however, “we as a Zanyari agency, have a good relation with 
more than 30 countries, exchanging information with their intelligence services, but we 
do not cooperate and share information with the KDP’s Parastin agency. . . . at times, we 
have had a better working relationship with Baghdad than we have with our [KDP] 
counterparts in Erbil” (Hama 2017).
A divided polity: the KDP-PUK civil war
The KDP and the PUK fought a short civil war in 1996–97, but that conflict had much 
deeper origins and, although open war ended in 1997, the civil war between the two 
parties continues to be fought by other means. Writing in 1996, Gunter argued that 
“when discussing how the Kurds can build their democracy, we must come to grips with 
three basic problems: primordial loyalties, proliferation of guns and armed militias, and 
the disastrous economic situation” (Gunter 1996, 241). Twenty-five years later, despite 
some important changes, these problems remain defining features of Iraqi Kurdish 
politics and society.
The roots of the KDP-PUK civil war go back to the establishment of contemporary 
Iraqi Kurdish politics after the Second World War. The KDP has been the dominant Iraqi 
Kurdish political party. The party has a strong clan or tribal basis, being led by the 
Barzani family (whose family name arises from their home town of Barzan in northern 
Iraqi Kurdistan). Mustafa Barzani, who emerged as the central Iraqi Kurdish leader in the 
inter-war years, led the KDP from its formation in 1946 until his death in 1979; his son 
Masoud Barzani has led the party since then; the party’s vice-president since 2010 is 
Nechirvan Barzani, grandson of Mustafa and nephew of Masoud. The origins of the PUK 
lie in divisions within the KDP from its foundation in 1946, in particular between the 
Barzanis and more leftist nationalists led by Ibrahim Ahmad and Jalal Talabani. In 1964 
these disputes escalated, with the Barzanis using their Peshmerga to force Ahmad, 
Talabani and their supporters to flee to Iran (McDowall 2007, 317; Waisy 2015, 220). 
In 1975 Talabani formed the PUK, formalizing the split from the KDP.
The differences between the KDP and the PUK are diverse and deeply embedded. 
The two parties are strongly territorially based, with each having their own stronghold 
regions, the KDP in the north centred on Dohuk and part of Erbil and the PUK in the 
south centered on Sulaymaniyah and Kirkuk. The differences include language, with 
people in KDP regions generally speaking the Badini dialect of Kurdish and people in 
PUK regions generally speaking the Sorani dialect, and religion, with the KDP and the 
PUK associated with the Qadri and Naqshbandi orders respectively within Sufi Islamic 
mysticism. Ideologically, “the KDP is supposedly more conservative, traditional, 
nationalistic, tribally-based” (Gunter 2007), whereas the PUK is a more leftist socialist 
or social democratic party. The KDP is also viewed as a more rurally-based party and 
the PUK as a more urban educated elite party. Additionally, Iraqi Kurdish politics is 
highly personalized, with the conflicts between the individual leaders of the KDP and 
the PUK (and sometimes within the two parties) a central element of the region’s 
politics.
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Armed force – and the Peshmerga as the instrument of force – has been central to the 
relationship between the KDP and the PUK. As with the initial split in 1964, armed force 
was the means of pursuing politics and resolving disputes even before the PUK was 
established. From the 1960s to the 1990s, the two parties had a long history of deep 
differences, conflict, on-off war and periodic truces (Gunter 1996; Nawshirwan 1998; 
Razoux 2015, 329). The only time they were able to unite was when the Kurds lost all 
their bases after the Iraq-Iran war in 1988 and Saddam Hussein’s government launched 
the Anfal genocide campaign to annihilate the Kurds, leading to a united Kurdistan front 
(Baray Kurdistani) (Human Rights Watch 1993; Mustafa 1988).
The first elections for the Kurdish regional parliament in May 1992 resulted in the 
KDP and the PUK each gaining half the seats and the formation of a national unity 
government – but tensions were never far below the surface. Armed clashes between 
KDP and PUK Peshmerga broke out in 1994 and a full-scale civil war occurred in 
1996–97. The civil war of the 1990s was known in Kurdish as “brakuji”, or the killing 
of brothers, reflecting the bitterness of the internecine conflict (Alaaldin 2014). A US- 
brokered peace agreement was accepted in 1998, leaving the KDP controlling the north-
ern half of Iraqi Kurdistan, the PUK the south and central governing institutions divided 
on a fifty-fifty basis. The northern KDP-governed area is known as the “yellow” zone and 
the southern PUK-governed area as the “green” zone (Ala’Aldeen 2016). While the 1998 
agreement brought peace – in the sense of an end to direct fighting – it reinforced and 
embedded the sharp division of politics and society between the KDP and the PUK.
A further government unification agreement was concluded between the KDP and the 
PUK in 2006, but a close examination of the document shows that there was little appetite 
for real unification. The government unification agreement stated that for reasons of the 
“supreme interest of the people of the Kurdistan Region”, implementing the new Iraqi 
constitution, “establishing a genuine federal and democratic Iraq; restoring Kirkuk, 
Khanaqin, Sinjar, Makhmour, and other Arabized areas” the two parties agreed upon 
“partnership, consensus and equity”. The first point of the document established “a new 
post of Vice President of the Region”, who “will be from the PUK and will also serve as 
the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Peshmerga forces of the Kurdistan Region”, to 
work alongside the President of the Region and the Commander-in-Chief of the 
Peshmerga, who is the KDP leader. The document also specified that the Prime 
Minister would be from the KDP and the Speaker of the Kurdistan National Assembly 
(KNA) would be from the PUK. The agreement thus formalised a fifty/fifty division of 
power and created a form of bi-governance system, with two competing governing 
powers within the one government. The agreement also included commitments in 
relation to elections, that sought to preclude any significant change arising from elec-
tions: “(F)or the next election, the KDP and PUK will participate in a joint slate as equals, 
and at that time the post of the Speaker of the KNA will go to the KDP and the Prime 
Minister will be from the PUK”. The document also illustrated the continuing lack of 
trust between the two parties: “If either of the ministerial blocs withdraws from the joint 
cabinet, the entire cabinet will be considered as resigned” (Kurdistan Regional 
Government 2006). Implicitly, neither party was willing to tolerate the other governing 
without it: either govern together or no government.
The KDP-PUK civil war is also underpinned and reinforced by economic dynamics 
similar to those in other civil war situations (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Keen 2012). The 
DEFENCE STUDIES 231
KDP and the PUK act as rentier systems, extracting resources from the regions they 
control and allocating resources to their members and supporters. At the same time, the 
two parties compete to control resources, primarily natural resources and border tariffs. 
According to Ali Saleem and Skelton (2020, 6): “(R)ather than reinforcing loyalty to the 
regional government, networks of patronage in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) are 
tightly organised around the two main parties and their respective subregions. The 
potential for conflict arises when one party impedes on the capacity of the other to 
maintain its patronage networks.” In a situation with weak central institutions, armed 
forces – Peshmerga – are the ultimate determinant of control of resources.
An additional factor complicating and helping to perpetuate the KDP-PUK civil war is 
the involvement of external actors, specifically the central Iraqi government, Turkey and 
Iran. Since the 1990s all three of these external actors have intervened in Iraqi Kurdistan, 
politically, economically and militarily to advance their perceived interests, including 
access to economic resources, control of transport routes and their relative power vis-à- 
vis one another (Knights 2005, 154). Turkey has backed the KDP and Iran the PUK. The 
central Iraqi government has had a shifting policy of divide-and-rule towards the KDP 
and the PUK. None of these external actors has an interest in a stronger, more united 
Iraqi Kurdistan and their interventions have only served to reinforce the divisions within 
the region.
In recent years there have been important shifts in Iraqi Kurdish politics. These 
developments have partly challenged the KDP-PUK duopoly, but have also reinforced 
the civil war between the two parties. In particular, a number of new political parties, 
groupings and leaders emerged, countering the KDP’s and PUK’s hitherto dominance of 
the region’s politics. The growth of these groups reflected unhappiness, especially 
amongst younger people, with key features of Iraqi Kurdistan’s status quo, such as 
patronage, corruption and a poor human rights record. Most prominent has been the 
new political party Gorran (or Movement for Change – the word Gorran means change 
in Kurdish). Gorran was established in 2009 and gained 24% of votes in both 2009 and 
2013 Kurdish parliament elections, although falling to 12% in 2018 elections (- in the 
2013 elections Gorran’s share of the vote overtook that of the PUK which scored 18%, 
although the PUK overtook Gorran again in 2018 with 21% of the vote). These develop-
ments were a particular challenge for the PUK: Gorran itself was a splinter party from the 
PUK; the long-standing PUK leader Jalal Talabani had to withdraw from politics in 2012 
after suffering a stroke (and died in 2017), resulting in factional in-fighting within the 
PUK (Hama 2019). According to Alaaldin (2014), “(F)ormed as a reaction to the KDP’s 
nepotism and tribalism, the PUK itself fell victim to the same dynamics and suffered 
a decline, particularly over the past decade.” In terms of the civil war dynamic between 
the two parties this had two impacts: the KDP was emboldened to attempt to assert 
a hegemonic position, as opposed to accepting the PUK as an equal (Hama 2019); the 
PUK, in contrast, has perceived itself as increasingly threatened and besieged. In such 
circumstances, maintaining a loyal party militia is seen as the only way for the PUK and 
its leaders to survive.
The continued depth of divisions between the KDP and the PUK was indicated by 
events surrounding the independence referendum organized by the Kurdish regional 
government in September 2017. The decision to call a referendum was driven by the KDP 
and its leader Masoud Barzani and arose from calculations about internal Kurdish 
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politics at least as much (if not more) than from a belief that the referendum was likely to 
advance the cause of Kurdish independence (Mustafa 2020). Against the background of 
divisions within the PUK between the Talabani family and opponents within the party, 
the referendum was “regarded by much of the Talabani wing as an attempt by Barzani to 
cement his power in Kurdistan at their expense” (Wörmer and Lamberty 2018, 78). The 
referendum provided the Iraqi government with the opportunity to re-take the contested 
city of Kirkuk in October 2017, which had been under Kurdish control since 2014 when 
Iraqi forces had fled in the face of Islamic State advances. Following an apparent PUK- 
KDP agreement to defend Kirkuk, the Talabani wing within the PUK reached an 
agreement with the Iraqi government to withdraw its Peshmerga forces from Kirkuk, 
resulting in the collapse of Kurdish defences, the withdrawal of all Kurdish forces and the 
loss of about one-fifth of the territory the Kurds had controlled only days earlier 
(Wörmer and Lamberty 2018, 81). On one day, 16 October, eight of the 14 RGBs split 
along KDP-PUK lines (Davies 2019, 1). The 2017 referendum, supposedly an important 
step on the road to Kurdish independence, was instead a new low point in KDP-PUK 
relations.
In summary, the civil war between the KDP and the PUK has been a defining feature 
of Iraqi Kurdish for nearly three quarters of a century since the 1960s and has become 
deeply institutionalised. Today, Kurdistan’s society is deeply polarized and a soft civil war 
continues, fought through politics, governing institutions, elite struggles, social media 
and the economy. In these circumstances, control of Peshmerga forces remains central to 
the KDP and the PUK and both sides remain reluctant to surrender control of their forces 
to the KRG and the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs.
Peshmerga: the name, history and image
This section explores what we describe as the heroic-mythic status of the Peshmerga in 
Iraqi Kurdish society, showing how this constitutes a further obstacle to reform. 
Peshmerga is a Kurdish word composed of the two words pesh (“before” or “in front 
of”) and merga (“death”), which is roughly translated as “those who face death”, with the 
heroic connotation of being unafraid of death or willing to die for one’s cause (Chapman 
2009, 37). The word Peshmerga, as a description of bravery, has longer roots in verna-
cular Kurdish. As noted earlier, the use of the term Peshmerga to describe Kurdish armed 
forces dates back to the Kurdish Mahabad Republic of 1945–46 in north-western Iran. 
The Mahabad Republic established its own armed forces, raising the issue of what they 
should be called. The President of the Republic, Qazi Mohammed, appointed two famous 
poets to address the issue. While they were considering the matter, so the story goes, the 
waiter serving them tea said he had heard that a man who dies very bravely in battle is 
called a “peshmerga” and the word was then proposed and adopted as the official name of 
the Republic’s military (Nawshirwan 2006, 1993, 161; Nerwiy 2012, 146; Qazi 2008, 9). 
The Mahabad Republic was rapidly crushed by the Iranian government, but is viewed by 
Iraqi and Iranian Kurds as a historic standard-bearer for the cause of Kurdish indepen-
dence. Peshmerga subsequently became one of the most widely used words in Iraqi 
Kurdish language and literature and the concept is now deeply embedded in Iraqi 
Kurdish society. In the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s the Peshmerga led a series of wars for 
greater autonomy within or independence from Iraq. The embeddedness of the 
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Peshmerga in Iraqi Kurdish society is such that almost every family in Iraqi Kurdistan has 
someone who is, has been or may claim to be a Peshmerga.
Peshmerga is also a call. It calls young Kurds to overcome the fear of death. As a word 
uttered repeatedly throughout daily life, describing the act of being a soldier, it has had 
a powerful impact on Iraqi Kurdish society. As Reinhart Koselleck (1985, 75) put it, “it is 
not deeds that shock humanity, but the words describing them.” Accordingly, the word 
Peshmerga to describe a soldier is as powerful as, if not more powerful than, actually 
being a soldier. In this way, the name Peshmerga has an impact on how others experience 
the Peshmerga and how it is made intelligible to them. Peshmerga is thus a concept, with 
a history, a trajectory, a particular meaning and an aura.
The idea of Peshmerga also has strong heroic, even mythic, connotations. The 
Peshmerga has been a literary hero and protagonist since the late 1950s. The first 
novelette published under the title Peshmerga was in 1959 in Iranian Kurdistan by an 
author close to the political elites of the Mahabad republic called Rahimi Qazi, a work re- 
published in Iraqi Kurdistan in 2008 (Qazi 2008). In a pre-modern or not yet fully 
modern society, such as a Kurdistan, with relatively low levels of literacy, the image is 
more powerful than any other tool of thinking: this is apparent in the very limited 
number of readers of books and newspapers in the region and the prevalence of television 
and other medium of communications. The image of the Peshmerga is a part of the 
process of resistance. Resistance is resisting the reality, i.e. being able to imagine another 
reality. This process requires a hero, a superman, and the Peshmerga fulfils this role. 
Because freedom is the ability to escape the boundaries of current reality, then imagina-
tion is the tool for achieving freedom. This necessity has become part of Kurdish social 
reality. Therefore, it is not surprising to see a link between Peshmerga and freedom. 
Freedom requires courage, sacrifice and heroics – the Peshmerga are the ones who deliver 
these things. This is how the myth of the Peshmerga blossoms.
The concept of the Peshmerga thus requires demystification. A Peshmerga is neither 
a person nor simply a soldier. Sherko Bekas, a well-known Kurdish poet was known as 
poet Peshmerga; Massoud Barzani, Iraqi Kurdish President from 2005 to 2017, described 
himself as a president Peshmerga. Peshmerga is a status, a hero, a herculean figure. 
Peshmerga defies nature, is stronger than any other forces and arrives before anything 
else. As Bekas wrote, in one his many poems for the Peshmerga, “It was night/only 
Peshmerga and snow were in the foot of the mountain/the snow slept/Peshmerga came 
down slowly” (Bekas 2006 – authors’ translation). Here, the Peshmerga defeats nature: 
snow sleeps, but the Peshmerga doesn’t; when the snow sleeps, the Peshmerga com-
mences his activity. The Peshmerga has a particular language, unlike ordinary language. 
A language with “special conditions” qualifies it to become “myth” in the Barthesian 
sense (Barthes 2012). There is a plethora of popular songs and hymns praising the 
Peshmerga, describing him as a tiger, a lion and the like. As a result, there is 
a narrative of a hero who sacrifices himself altruistically for the people. The people 
have to adore this figure and express all due respect to him.
The linkage between the people and the Peshmerga results in specific relationships and 
a form of power. This power manifests itself through a web, which includes not only the 
Peshmerga, but also the political parties, the government, intellectuals and society. 
Through this web, images are produced, others are deconstructed, taboos are created 
and silences are imposed. This mythmaking of the Peshmerga is problematic in many 
234 S. AZIZ AND A. COTTEY
ways: mythical figures are beyond rationalisation and organization; more dangerously, 
they are also beyond criticism. For a figure with such a mythical status it is difficult to 
become an ordinary soldier. The mythical status of the Peshmerga within Iraqi Kurdish 
society is thus an important obstacle to the reform and modernization of the Peshmerga 
as a military force.
In the context of current discussions on reform there is debate over whether the name 
Peshmerga should be retained or abandoned. Based on our informal discussions, there 
are two schools of thought on this issue. One school argues that the name is an obstacle to 
reform and should be removed, the other suggests the opposite. The removal school 
argues that the era of the Peshmerga is over. Today, the Kurdistan regional government 
has a responsibility to provide security and protect urban areas. This requires a modern, 
centralized, disciplined army. The other side argues that the Peshmerga is symbolic 
capital in a Bourdieuan sense: “resources based on cultural categorizations and societal 
perceptions that bestow meanings such as prestige or recognition” (quoted from Watts 
2012, 72) and renowned globally, profiled in major global news outlets such as the BBC, 
CNN and the like. Moreover, the Peshmerga is a concept that differentiates the (Iraqi) 
Kurds from others.
The Peshmerga reform process
After beginning to work more closely with the Peshmerga during the war against Islamic 
State, the US and its international coalition partners concluded that the Peshmerga needed 
to be reformed in order to enhance its military effectiveness and make it a more durable 
partner. Setbacks which the Peshmerga had suffered against Islamic State in 2014 and the 
prospect of material military assistance from Western partners persuaded Iraqi Kurdish 
leaders to support a new reform effort. In 2015 then President of the Kurdistan Region of 
Iraq Masoud Barzani invited the UK to assist the KRI with Peshmerga reform. In 2016 the 
UK completed a scoping study on Peshmerga reform and appointed a Special Defence 
Adviser to the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs to support reform efforts. In 2017 the KRG 
formally endorsed a reform policy entitled “Peshmerga of the Future” (Baghdadpost 2017). 
In 2017–18 a Reform Directorate was created within the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs to 
support the implementation of the reform process. The US, the UK and Germany have 
together been the main external partners supporting the reform process (Davies 2019).
The “Peshmerga of the Future” plan incorporates 35 detailed proposals. These include: 
the development of an official security strategy for the KRG, including a military strategy 
which would set out the basis for the number and structure of the Peshmerga needed; the 
establishment of a new General Command for the KRI’s armed forces; the incorporation 
of the KDP’s and PUK’s currently separate Peshmerga with those controlled by the 
Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs; and the development of a military doctrine. The plan calls 
for a new approach to recruitment based on competence, for all members of the armed 
forces to hold only one post (which would reverse the current common practice of 
Peshmerga holding other positions/jobs outside their military roles), an overhaul of the 
salary system and a more “systematic and effective” approach to training. The plan also 
proposes a unified approach to weapons system across the Peshmerga and, in a what 
would be a new move for a hitherto purely ground force, the establishment of an 
“auxiliary aerial wing” (Ministry of Peshmerga 2018).
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Coming only a few months after the “Peshmerga of the Future” reform plan had been 
adopted in May 2017, however, the events surrounding the fall of Kirkuk in October 2017 
highlighted the severe difficulty of reform. The war against ISIS from 2014 to 2017 
resulted in what Hawramy (2018) describes as “unprecedented cooperation” and a new 
“level of trust” between the KDP and the PUK and their respective Peshmerga forces. The 
underlying tensions between the KDP and the PUK, however, remained and were 
brought to the fore by the independence referendum. As noted above, PUK forces 
withdrew from Kirkuk and the supposedly unified RGBs split along KDP-PUK lines. 
According to Hawramy (2018), “[T]he confrontation has split the Peshmerga forces once 
again along party lines and threatened to undo years of hard work in trying to unify the 
forces of the two main ruling parties . . . [T]he checkpoints between the PUK and the 
KDP territories have been reinforced since the October confrontation. There have even 
been calls for the official division of the Kurdistan region into PUK and KDP territories. 
Party officials have accused each other on their TV channels of betrayal and being on the 
payroll of the enemies of the Kurds. The impact has been severe on the Peshmerga 
forces.” The RGB forces which disintegrated at Kirkuk were theoretically re-united in 
2018 (Ali 2018), but the events of 2017 suggest that these forces would likely split again in 
the event of a crisis. The 2017 battle at Kirkuk also suggests that KDP and the PUK 
remain highly unlikely to allow their Peshmerga to be integrated into a single force 
controlled by the Ministry of Peshmerga. In addition to the KDP’s and PUK’s fear of one 
another, given wider disillusionment with the established political order in Iraqi 
Kurdistan, the two parties are also wary that a united independent Peshmerga might 
side with wider society against both parties. Separately, over many decades the 
Peshmerga have developed a particular esprit de corps which has helped to make them 
a relatively effective military force and, here also, Kurdish political leaders and Peshmerga 
commanders fear that a one size fits all Western approach to military reform could 
undermine this esprit de corps and thereby weaken the Peshmerga as a military force.
An examination of other areas also illustrates slow progress with reform. There has 
been no progress on the development of a security strategy and a military strategy, 
supposedly the first item on the 35 point reform plan, in significant part because the 
KDP and the PUK differ on such basic questions as who are the Kurds enemies and allies 
within the region. The Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs lists five projects where progress 
has been made: a strategic military defence project within the Ministry, an Operating 
Concept for the Peshmerga, electronic payments of salaries of Peshmerga, a cooperation 
project between Peshmerga forces and Iraqi security forces, and laws and regulations of 
the Ministry. Even on these projects, however, it is unclear what they involve and whether 
real progress has been made in implementing them. As of late 2020, further, the section of 
the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs website detailing reforms had not been updated since 
2018 (Ministry of Peshmerga 2018).
A number of other problems may be identified with the reform process and external 
support for it. First the reform process and external support for the process have engaged 
only with the Peshmerga, the Ministry of Peshmerga and senior KDP and PUK leaders/ 
commanders. This may seem logical and is pragmatic: if the challenge is to reform the 
Peshmerga, then focus on the Peshmerga and those who control them. This approach, 
however, excludes other important institutional actors, in particular the Kurdish regional 
parliament, other political parties and wider civil society. By default, the reform process 
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reinforces the KDP-PUK duopoly over the Peshmerga: those who control Peshmerga 
matter and shape the reform process, those who do not control Peshmerga do not matter 
and are excluded from the reform process. There is a strong case that the reform process 
should be widened to include other political parties, the Kurdish regional parliament and 
the initiation of a wider civil society debate on the Peshmerga and that external actors 
need to engage with this wider set of actors.
Second, external assistance has had a strongly technical character, focusing on the 
provision of equipment to and training of the Peshmerga and changes at the level of the 
Ministry of Peshmerga. This logic partly emerged during the war against Islamic State 
from 2014 to 2017, when the immediate challenge for both the Kurds and the US and its 
coalition partners was how to strengthen the combat effectiveness of the Peshmerga. This 
approach, however, has continued since 2017, with further provision of equipment and 
on-going operations against Islamic State forces (Shilani 2020a; van Wilgenburg 2020). 
Provision of equipment, training and organisational reforms may be necessary to 
enhance the military effectiveness of the Peshmerga, but they do not address the larger 
political question of who controls the Peshmerga.
Third, the “Peshmerga of the Future” reform plan does not really address the existing 
praxis and culture of the Peshmerga. This relates to both of the core issues discussed 
above. First, most Peshmerga are members of either the KDP or the PUK and their 
ultimate loyalty is to their political party, not to the putative state that is the KRG. Second, 
the heroic-mythic status of the Peshmerga in Iraqi Kurdish society means that they are 
viewed as outside or above the kinds of rules and constraints which govern militaries in 
most modern states. Addressing these issues requires deep changes at individual, orga-
nizational and cultural levels. As Foucault put it, establishing a modern military requires 
creating a “subject whose conduct is highly regulated and whose body is at the service of 
government”; one must “get rid of the peasant and given him the air of a soldier” 
(Foucault 1991, 135).
Fourth, other regional actors – the central Iraqi government, Turkey and Iran – have no 
real interest in a more united and integrated Peshmerga force. From the Iraqi government 
perspective, a more united and integrated Peshmerga force would potentially bring the 
Kurds closer to full independence and, probably more substantively, give the Kurds 
a stronger hand in struggles over so-called “disputed territories” and oil resources. From 
the Turkish perspective, given Turkey’s long-standing struggle with the PKK, anything 
that unifies even parts of the Kurdish population is a negative (not withstanding that the 
KDP are sometime allies with Turkey against the PKK). For Iran, a united Peshmerga 
under Western, especially American tutelage, would be a setback in terms of the regional 
balance of power. The Iraqi government, Turkey and Iran are thus happy to quietly 
practice divide-and-rule towards the KDP and PUK and have no real interest in backing 
the reform process. Although the Western powers have encouraged cooperation between 
the Iraqi security forces and the Peshmerga, and there has been some progress on this 
front in the war against Islamic State, there are clear limits to such cooperation.
Conclusion
This article has analysed the Peshmerga reform process initiated in 2017. We have 
argued that the reform process is fundamentally constrained by the deep division in 
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Iraqi Kurdish politics between the KDP and the PUK and the continued soft civil war 
between the two parties. In these circumstances, both parties remain deeply reluctant to 
surrender control of their Peshmerga forces. While some more technical elements of 
Peshmerga reform may proceed, the Peshmerga are likely to remain instruments of the 
KDP and the PUK rather than a truly national force of the KRG. The heroic mythic 
status of the Peshmerga in Iraqi Kurdish society constitutes a further obstacle to their 
reform.
The Peshmerga reform process has, to a significant extent, been driven by the US and 
its Western allies. Both Kurdish political leaders and Western governments, however, are 
playing a political game, where there is an unstated gap between their rhetoric and what 
can likely be achieved in terms of Peshmerga reform. After working closely with the 
Peshmerga during the war against Islamic State from 2014 to 2017, the US and its 
Western allies took the view that a reformed and united Peshmerga would be more 
effective in helping to counter Islamic State. Having established a newly close relationship 
with the US and its allies, Kurdish leaders were hardly likely to openly oppose Western 
calls for Peshmerga reform, especially if the reform process included training and 
equipment from the West. Rhetorically, Iraqi Kurdish leaders remain committed to the 
Peshmerga reform process (Kurdistan24 2019; Shilani 2020b). As we have argued, 
however, there is good reason to be sceptical that KDP and PUK leaders really support 
the type of reform that would lead to a unified Peshmerga. Likewise, Western govern-
ments remain publicly committed to the Peshmerga reform process (Shilani 2019; van 
Wilgenburg 2020a). Experience of engagement with Iraqi Kurdish political leaders and 
the Peshmerga over recent years, however, must surely have made Western officials well 
aware of the obstacles to reform. The highest priority for the US and its Western allies 
regarding the Peshmerga is its effectiveness as an ally against Islamic State. In these 
circumstances, Western governments are in practice likely to support limited Peshmerga 
reform so long as it enhances the Peshmerga’s military effectiveness against Islamic State, 
even if it fails to address the larger problems of the Peshmerga’s place in Iraqi Kurdish 
politics and society. Deeper reform, in particular unification of the KDP’s and PUK’s 
Peshmerga forces, is unlikely to progress unless and until the larger political divide 
between the two parties is addressed. The experience of nearly three quarters of 
a century of Iraqi Kurdish politics since the 1960s, as well of other cases of deeply divided 
societies (Guelke 2012; Horowitz 1993), shows how difficult it is to overcome or bridge 
such divides.
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